daniel bolger. and then david cameron takes questions from members of the house of commons. after that, the chinese premier holds a news conference. ♪ >> this week, our guest is retired army general daniel bolger, author of "why we lost -- a general's inside account of the iraq and afghanistan wars." he talks about his deployments to those to war zones. his thoughts on what went wrong and his ideas on how to move forward as conflict continues in the two countries. brian: general daniel bolger you opened your book with this paragraph.

" i'm a united states army general and i lost the global war on terrorism. it is like alcoholics anonymous. step one is admitting you have a problem. i have a problem. thanks to our problem, all of america has a problem. two lost campaigns end a war gone awry." daniel: this is the most serious thing i have ever had to do in my life. where we are at in this war is not where i ever wanted to be. the american people -- i owed the american people and accounting of what i did, what my peers did. to see why and what we can learn from it. brian: whose idea was it to title this book "why we lost"? daniel: i was going to call it something more neutral. after i finished writing it, i

realized what i had actually written was a narrative that gave an explanation of why we failed. brian: when did you retire? daniel: i retired in june of 2013 and i was a lieutenant general. brian: what are you doing now? daniel: i teach history at university of north carolina raleigh. brian: where were you born? daniel: chicago, illinois. the west side of chicago and then the west suburbs, westchester. brian: and you went to college where? daniel: the citadel, the military college of south carolina. the army selected me for graduate school. brian: what time did you go to college? daniel: i was commissioned in

the army in 1978 and i completed my graduate schooling in 1986. my dad served as an infantryman in the korean war. he rose to the rank of sergeant and then got out. he was proud of his service. the people in my community were volunteering or being drafted for vietnam. until i was older, i never met anyone who resisted the draft. my neighbors were all world war ii veterans. i wanted to see if i could do that. brian: first of all, where did you get your commission? daniel: the citadel. it is run sort of like west point. but it is a state school. ryan: what were the highlights -- brian: what were the highlights of your career?

daniel: the most important thing , i served mostly during the cold war. we were preparing for combat, so we did not fight. i was a company commander. my division commander at one point was norman schwarzkopf. during the gulf war, i was a major. no action occurred there, but we were ready. during the mid-1990's, i was with the 101st airborne as an infantry battalion commander. i got to go to haiti for a few days, that was a peacekeeping operation. i wore a blue hat, as did my troops. united nations, yes. my first -- i was a brigade commander in korea.

as a kernel. when i made general, a war had broken out in my first combat experience was in 2005 when i deployed to iraq. i was a one star, a brigadier general. my duties, i was the deputy commander for the senior field command. after a few months, i spent a year training the iraqi army, air force, navy, and their small marine corps. working briefly for david tereus . working briefly for general david this radius -- petraus. brian: do you have any idea of how many generals there are in the army? daniel: just over 300 generals. of that number, 43 are

three-star generals. brian: what is the difference from someone being a general and a kernel? daniel: if you are a general you are part of the inner leadership, part of the board of directors. the army is a large organization . well over one million people in uniform. you are part of that inner circle. the key thing they tell you, you have been selected, not anointed. they can get a little inflated with themselves. we were put in a briefing and the first thing a four-star -- congratulations, but be aware if all 38 of you left the army, we have 38 more on the bench. brian: i want to show you a

video of a four-star general that you know back in 2003 testifying in front of the senate. eric shinseki, he went on to run the veterans administration. >> several hundred thousand soldiers are probably -- we are talking about control over a piece of geography that is fairly significant with the kind of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. it takes significant ground force presence to maintain safe and secure environment to ensure people are fed, water is

distributed. all of the normal responsibilities that go along with it. brian: why did you put that in your book? general bolger: he was the chief of staff of the army. think of the chain of command the army works for the secretary of defense. responsible to the people. that clip, he was testifying before the senate and they were asking him, how many troops it would take to secure iraq after we knocked out saddam's army? he fought in vietnam, badly wounded in vietnam and he served in the balkans. if you would into a country the size of a rock with 28 million people -- iraq with 28 million people on the ground, a lot of ethnic tension, and dangerous

neighbors, he was saying, you cannot do this on the cheap. he was speaking from experience. he was providing his best military advice. he was chastised in public by the secretary of defense, donald rumsfeld they did not want to hear that. they thought it would be a quick operation and we would be greeted as liberators. people would throw roses at our vehicles. general shinseki had a much clearer view. he was the chief of staff of the army. it was leaked when he still had a year of monstrous, -- he still had a year left in office, it was leaked that he would have a successor.

somebody made sure to put the word out. in the military, anyway, they made him a lame-duck. they disagreed with his military advice and they publicly undercut him. when he had his retirement, it is usually a big event and sometimes the president comes. secretary rumsfeld was not there. brian: what did you think of at the time? general bolger: in 2003, i just made brigadier general. i was picked the month after the testimony occurred. i was in korea serving with the second infantry division, did not know that anybody was going to iraq.

we were not talking about it and were not supposed to talk about it. when that testimony occurred, i knew he knew what he was talking about. his reputation was good and he spoke from experience. he had seen the cost of partial escalations in vietnam. he knew what it takes to secure villages and he was given a warning. we should have listened. i knew he was onto something. i have to tell you, like most people in our service, i thought things were different this time. maybe this time, we will get it right. what happened in the first gulf war, i thought, if we could do that, we had just beaten the afghan taliban, i thought, we will knock these guys out

quickly. maybe they are right. maybe they know something i don't know. ryan: here is some other video i want you to see. this is from 2007. our president now was in the senate. president obama i think the surge has had some impact. i would hope it would. i would argue the impact has been relatively modest given the investment. it is not clear to me that the primary success has anything to do with the surge. you said that it is political. the reason for the success. not because of an increase in troop strength. we have seen some modest decline in sectarian violence inside baghdad.

that has been purchased at the cost of increased u.s. casualties. it is unsustainable. brian: put that into context. general bolger: it is interesting to see the president speaking as a senator. he looks a lot younger in that picture. the last word is the key word. unsustainable. by definition, it is like a wave coming up on the beach. the surge of troops -- the majority of those troops in baghdad, what the president was referring to was something that it happened. the sunni arab tribes split with al qaeda and iraq. -- al qaeda in iraq. killing women and children, imposing things.

you had to worship a certain way. all of that stuff got out of control. that happened before the surge. it started in 2005 along the syrian border and by late 2006, it was beginning to settle down because some of the sunnis had come to our side. unsustainable is key. as we look at iraq today, we see isis, those guys are the same insurgents we were dealing with in 2005 and 2006, 2009 and 2010. the head of isis was lieutenant

at that time. the surge was unsustainable. it created temporary security. when you pull them out, the enemy waits you out. it goes back to the oldest things up guerrilla warfare. enemy advances, we retreat. we advanced, the enemy looked at their watches. brian: you relate what happens in iraq and afghanistan to other wars, other times, other generals. why did you do that? general bolger: the u.s. experience in iraq is not

unique. it has taken myself to task. i thought i understood what they were telling me. i went along with my peers and made some of the mistakes they warned against. in their time, in ancient china he was captured by french forces. he fought in the russian campaign. he was at waterloo in 1815. he had seen guerrilla warfare. he had been successful and he had failed. as a general, what is history -- what does history teach us? in that regard, i hope that maybe -- brian: what was your biggest mistake? general bolger: not

understanding the best way to use our forces. the american military is built for short, violent, decisive wars against conventional forces. it is not built to do decades long rebuilding, counterinsurgency against irregular forces. we never controlled the time clock. we never had the discussion with our political leaders. we never controlled the avenue of governance. the locals were always running the elections. we would influence them, but it was going to be an iraqi government or an afghan government. as a result, there would be a great deal of dissatisfaction. they would see the government and -- in baghdad as u.s. puppets.

brian: we have some video of you training afghan army troops. how much training did you do in iraq and afghanistan? general bolger: i was in charge of the coalition military assistance training team. our team of about 550 allied troops working with the iraqis, built large portions of their current army and air force. i did a year there. afghanistan, i was charged with their military and they have police. in afghanistan, i have the whole operation. brian: here is video from 2012. >> legacy weapons from the soviet era. building on the existing

experience of the afghan national army with new technology is key, according of nato's -- according to nato's training mission. >> focus on training. we do not deliver a lot of the instruction ourselves. we teach the instructors how to do it. >> the afghan army officers we spoke to set their soldiers are ready to fight the insurgency. but many worried about the future. brian: we've read all the time that they do not care that much. general bolger: i thought alongside both of them. i found them to be brave in combat. when he wanted to get a unit to

do the best, we looked at training. giving them the right weapons. that is one component. the next component, embedded advisors. somebody who can teach them every day and be with them side-by-side. various countries did it as well as us, working side-by-side. thirdly, it it helps to have a u.s. or allied partnering. somebody they can say ok, i will go do patrols. how do patrols look -- work? the system was built on that threefold step. we have had success training the korean army. they fought as our alley in the vietnam -- ally in the

vietnam war. they were built to work alongside us. the reporter made an interesting comment. the afghans were worried. they do not know what the length of the u.s. commitment is. we saw this in iraq. we pulled out the bulk of our force in 2011. that was the first leg, the training part. they did not have embedded advisors. isis rears their ugly head and this army is very shaky. we should not be surprised by that. you can not undo decades of soviet stuff in eight years. afghanistan, we have 10,000 troops there in a training and advising role. we will draw down to 5000 the next year.

we will probably see a similar result to what we saw in iraq when isis attacked. brian: what did you think of donald rumsfeld? general bolger: a very forceful guy. sometimes a little too forceful. i think he had a clearer view than most people think. i don't think he always had as clear a view on how to fight them. within the military, secretary rumsfeld has this impression that he is a head chopper. his successor, secretary gates fired a lot more generals and admirals than secretary rumsfeld did. his bark was worse than his bite. brian: here he is talking about his book.

fixing the problem would be simple before the invasion rumsfeld told troops. secretary rumsfeld: i do not know how many times i said, anyone who tells you how long it will last is making a mistake. people are almost always wrong. general bolger: he ought to know because he was wrong. major combat operations, that is the part of the war the americans like. the first few months in afghanistan. the first few months in iraq. we defeat them very well. the problem is, the enemy we

were fighting did not choose to end the war. they chose to continue the fight in a style that suited them. very difficult to tell which guy is a farmer and which guy is an insurgent. it is the second war we were not well suited for. no one could say how long that lasted. moreover, guys like him, we were not as blunt as general shinseki was. instead, we always seem to think that just a little bit more, maybe a surge of troops would solve it. the reality was, it would not. they can only be defeated by an effort of decades. we never said that to the american people. the civilian leadership has

rarely talked in terms of how long this effort will last. only recently with the effort to go back to a rock into with issa has the president started to say publicly, this is an effort of years that may last past my administration. -- two iraq -- to iraq with isis has the president started say publicly this is an effort of years that may last past my administration. our constitution says all that should be authorized and debated. brian: we hear the generals supporting the president whether it be george bush or barack obama. after they get out, they write books and tell us what they were really thinking. when you are sitting around talking to your officers and

friends, what did the other generals say they thought about this where? general bolger: two things hit all of us. most of us had some disquiet within the first year or so after the iraq invasion. things seem to settle down well in afghanistan. 2003 2004, people started to say, things are going wrong. i can remember a general who served in iraq in the first work, he knew that area very well. i remember he used the term counterinsurgency and a lot of our ears pricked up. we never heard that strong public u.s. commitment that we

would stick with it. the military guys, we figured we will keep trying this month and hope the political guys have our back. i am large, that happened. -- by and large, that happened. in general, we kept going. what we never had was that honest discussion with our political leaders to say, if you want to fight a us-led counterinsurgency, you are talking about 20 or 30 years. there needs to be a publicly debated treaty. like we have in korea. we will help defend this country for a long time. we never had that debate. we have no treaty with iraq or afghanistan. we could choose to pull our troops out tomorrow. our enemies judge us based on past performance.

they have seen us leave in 1991. they believe we will leave again in the fight against isis. they saw us pull out when the soviets collapsed in 1989. the taliban is waiting us out. enemy advances, we retreat. enemy retreats, we advance. brian: these wars cost us a couple of trillion dollars not of it paid for, all borrowed. 7000 people have lost their lives. general bolger: 7000 military people. the 3000 civilian people we lost on 9/11. brian: is any of this worth it? general bolger: that is where we have to lay out the balance sheet. what has been accomplished, a great deal of attrition against al qaeda.

the old al qaeda with bin laden is no more. al qaeda is fragmented into successor groups. two of my soldiers that were killed work killed in fort hood in a terrorist act in the united states. those people are inspired by al qaeda. the classic al qaeda is no more. that said, that attrition is one thing. we are keeping the pressure on those terror networks. that needs to be done. what we are not doing, it is questionable how strong our allies are in this region.

can we depend on iraq? it is noteworthy that the current president of afghanistan, educated at columbia, speaks english better than i do. his first visits were general bolger: there is a message from our allies. brian lamb: after the vietnam war, the american government started to admit they did not understand the vietnamese. the same thing happened in this -- we do not understand the middle east. why did we get in these? general bolger: it depends on what you want your military to do. you do not have to have a great degree of cultural understanding -- you go in, you locate the

enemy military, and you destroy it. that is a military targeting issue. you do not need cultural awareness for that. when you talk about rebuilding states, you are on a steep slope. then the degree of cultural understanding is massive. one way to avoid it is to accept that afghans and iraqis have to choose their future and we have to be in a supportive role. we limit it to if you airstrikes and we accept that the iraqis will solve it in their way. americans want a quick solution, we cannot impose that on other countries unless we are willing to stay in an imperial sense.

brian lamb: in 2014, david patraeus talked about a surge of ideas. that's what tim do it -- david patraeus: the surge that mattered most was the surge of ideas. among the biggest, driving violence down, was reconciling the elements of the society, of the citizenry of iraq that had felt disenfranchised cast out. we reached out to that element we have done reconciliation before. we did it in the north when i was a vision commander. it was done again in 2004-2005

and it did not work. we were determined that this time it would work. we reached a number of agreements. brian lamb: you say in your book that he was interested in -- general bolger: david patraeus is the man of the match. he is the general most people identify with iraq and afghanistan. for all of his talents and skills, he was the commander of a surge in both countries that was temporary. he talks about the surge of ideas, and the ideas lasted. the sunnis are now with isis, not with the government in baghdad. they are struggling to get arab support. that surge worked. it started before general betray us -- david patraeus was there.

it was underway before he took command. he jumpstarted and he deserves credit. that idea did not persist. they did not crest the baghdad government because it was largely shia and kurds. when americans began to withdraw, sunni arabs lost. the prime minister of iraq -- a guy who played with the election results and tried to do it again last year and was run out -- he made a temporary agreement with sunni arabs, but he showed his true colors. he spent time in iraq. he never fully trusted the

americans or the sunni arabs. many sunni arabs were, but not all. a fine result for the. it lasted, but it is ephemeral. what have they changed? brian lamb: there are two generals the got attention for the wrong reasons. one of them is stanley mcchrystal. what was the reaction that article came out? general bolger: he is the unknown man of the match in war. those americans are not aware of this, eating our special operation forces, he was the guy that made sure we went after and did the damage on the rate on bin laden. he used to say that to fight a

number, you need a network. he organized better integration with the cia .. we learned things from his people -- in the old days, they did not know what they were doing. they were the experts at chasing down enemy leadership, and that was stanley mcchrystal. he spent so much time in the secret world, when he dealt with the media, he was caught flat-footed. michael hastings was at that time writing for "rolling stone," and he looked to be a good guy to write the article. his brother was an infantry the tenant. hastings loved writing by the military.

he had a little bit of a rebel streak. i think he thought it would be cool to be covered by rolling stone -- share the cover with lady gaga something. they never set the ground rules. you asked me earlier -- what do generals think about him? what we say among each other is one thing. stanley mcchrystal just blew off steam, the problem was that hastings wrote it all down. we lost stanley mcchrystal when we needed him most. david patraeus was not available. most people would agree that when he went into afghanistan he was tired physically. health problems had worn him

down. there are other things going on in his life. all of those were distractors for david patraeus. losing stanley mcchrystal was tough at the time we did. brian lamb: i want to read back what you have written. most officers look at the press and other civilian visitors much as citydwellers regard pigeons: noisy, obnoxious, and numerous. you deal with them, but you would not feed them here it explain that. general bolger: it comes down to -- military guys do not have much to say to the press. we are always worried about security. what we want to tell press is usually innocuous.

it is not really news. if a person like me makes news, i will probably get a call telling me that my services are "no longer needed." it puts the military in a position where they can either break even when they make news and lose. when i was a military guy, i did the bear minimum of press. as the war went on, the press became increasingly skeptical. i realized in afghanistan in 2011 -- 2013, the press did not want to hear anything for me. brian lamb: you also wrote that top military officers gave views

to civilians behind closed doors disdaining the old washington games. should they speak up? general bolger: after we retire, we can say what we think. i think on military subjects, we should at least offer opinions in public. all we can do is go with what the military is thinking and presented to the public. our personal opinions -- we certainly have them. more things happened behind closed doors then you would think. i spoke with secretary rumsfeld and secretary hagel, every one of them. and to them i could give my honest opinion.

they listened to what i said but they went their own way. brian lamb: quote we shared these roof awards with cadets at west point. general bolger: secretary gates sent to bank troop surge is into asia during his time -- sent two troop surges into asia during his time. i think the military has to give hard advice. the advice i did not give was to say, look, you have signed us

up, americans have signed up for a multi-decade insurgency. are the american people ok with that? do you understand that we will have troops in iraq for decades? are we good with that? that discussion was never had. the cause it was never had, we do not know how long these commitments will last. in korea, it was understood that we would support south korea as long as it took because we signed a treaty. we have not signed a treaty with iraq and afghanistan and there is no effort to do so. that tells me we have not had that discussion. brian lamb: what do you think of michael waltz? general bolger: i think he is very malleable. brian lamb: here's a clip from his book.

michael waltz: today, we have a policy of assumptions. right now, we are assuming. we are assuming that the afghan national army and afghan national police can stand on its own. i find it difficult to wrap my mind around how they are going to do alone, without our support, what western nations could not do. personally, hearing that an pentagon briefings, we have been hearing this since 2005. general bolger: he nailed it. it is a long-term effort. whenever you start talking about

another fighting year, you are in the mental framework of a british general and world war ii saying "one more push." you have to make a long-term commitment. the one thing that damaged ice is the most is evidence that the united states is not going to leave. the troops that state to provide training was willing to stick with it -- it is not going to be easy to get rid of the americans. every time we publicly talk about a deadline or limit this enemy -- mao zedong said it

enemy retreats, and in me advances. -- enemy advances. brian lamb: how far can this country go and how much can we afford when we are in debt? general bolger: that is a great discussion. that is a matter that should be debated in public. we should not be committed on the authority of just the commander-in-chief and that should be a public debate. most of these cases do not require immediate action. we have been at it for a long time, we can certainly have a debate. in this book i want to get people thinking about what just happened in the last 14 years why it happened, and what we should do about it. we should have an honest debate of where we should put our troops and how long they should say. our constitution has ways that can be arranged. the congress and president together can make treaties and

submit them to the senate. south korea, japan germany under nato, those are all authorized treaties that we consented on. brian lamb: you write "the war required away to use adversaries, and we failed," did any generals do good job? general bolger: i want to distinguish one thing. as far as individual leadership -- ethics -- i think generals did a good job. there is nobody here who was not trying to be a good deal commander. the mistake was in elections -- the gap, the error. backing into this counterinsurgency, the idea that

you can find a regular enemy with hundreds of thousands of u.s. troops. by definition, that was not sustainable. obama's statement was very true. at that point, the military needed to go to leadership and say, here are your choices. we can go out now, you can leave a small amount to help them, or you can commit to 20 or 30 years. choose one. we never had that choice. brian lamb: how the decisions during your time -- or before that -- do you think politicians made medical decisions as to what to do any rock and afghanistan? general bolger: all decisions are political. brian lamb: i mean, looking at the next election. general bolger: i think it was there but it was almost the reverse. president bush, to use his term,

they had a shellacing in the election. they basically told him, cut your losses and pull out. he had a new democratic congress coming in that one of that. instead, he chose to do the search. he did the opposite of what conventional wisdom in washington said to do. barack obama comes in and ran on a piece platform, want to do something different, but yet basically poses a surge model. in both cases, their domestic constituency were probably pulling the opposite. but they did the commander-in-chief thing. in that way, their similar to president truman. everybody loves him for standing up to the russians in berlin

for nato, for the marshall plan. we forget that truman left office with a 29% approval rating. the opposition party had taken control of the government. in history, we look back and see that decisions were not all political. brian lamb: what do you find in your classroom? general bolger: i teach students about 18-23 years old. north carolina state university is largely a science technology, and mathematics folks. but we have a strong officer training corps program. brian lamb: what do they think of this war? general bolger: they see it

pretty similar to what i saw in vietnam. they look at guys like me and say, how did you screw it all up? and i told him, let's learn from this. >> this is what they did. this is what their war was. they were cowboys going around this vicious neighborhood, trying to get to know the populace. that was the main idea of this counterinsurgency strategy. they were basically just waiting to get blown up. at night, they would search for bad guys to blow up. all of them carry assault

rifles, some of them carry good luck charms. sometimes they joked about what the last words would be. they were getting their jeeps and off they would go. this day this trip was on a street in baghdad from one camp to another. driving slow enough to find a bomb before it went off. you can see in the distance right now -- there goes. and then, [explosion] brian lamb: have you seen that before? general bolger: i have been there before. in the interviewer was exactly right. the boot is not armored, and we

lost men and women by walking. we have to think hard before we send young people in do that stuff on behalf of the country. i cannot be something where we say we don't know how long it will last. very, very hazardous. david mentions this in his work. many of these people have been there multiple times. i'm am not, by any means, the recordholder. many of these people were there three or four times. they include people from across the entire country. their heroism is not in doubt. guys like me should have given him better things to do. brian lamb: have you seen "american sniper?" general bolger: i plan to. brian lamb: it was the biggest january movie ever.

during the afghan war and iraqi war, we left coverage of those wars on television more than in vietnam. what is your sense of what the american people think of that? general bolger: the embedding was on the initial phase. the news media is not unlike our military. it is built for small, concise wars. it is difficult to cover. it seems like every day, you are out doing the same thing. trying to find the enemy. very hard to cover. "american sniper" is an indicator of this. after vietnam, the only movie which make money was a john

wayne movie, "the green beret." i think people saw it just because they like john wayne. it took a couple years after for other films to get coverage. even "the hurt locker," not a lot of viewers. the american people support the soldier. they don't understand it and frankly, it frustrates me. they don't know why it turned out this way. they are citizens of a superpower and i cannot understand why people are poking alongside the road looking for explosives in garbage piles. why are we? we don't understand this enemy and how to go after them.

we mistakingly believe that we have to rebuild countries, but what we need to do is narrow our focus, figure out who can kill us and go after them and only them. except the fact that there are parts of the world where bad things happen and we cannot fix all of it. brian lamb: you see these convoys and you know people are going to get hit. what good has it done and what impact has us being there had on all this activity with al qaeda and isis? general bolger: without leaders it is hard to mount international terrorism attacks. that has been a positive affect. with regards to the country, the jury is still out. it does not seem to be positive.

iraq and afghanistan are hollowed countries which now may not make it without american support unit we have asked our men and women to do difficult things and they have done it well. but we should not asked them to do all those things. that has to be done by local folks. the have to be iraqi were afghan. we need to stick to how to knock out conventional enemy forces. focus on that and that is the fight we need to fight and leave counterinsurgency to local people. brian lamb: what is your favorite part of your book? if you were to the part everyone should read? general bolger: the part i recommend that everyone should read -- and it was a hard book to write -- i would point them toward chapter 17.

chapter sivan teen -- chapter 17 is called "attrition." we pulled out of iraq that year and our forces are trying to keep the peace west of kandahar. our soldiers are having trouble psychologically in dealing with multiple towards. our leadership is having trouble seeing the war, because all they see our statistics and numbers. brian lamb: i will read what you write. " marines film themselves urinating on corpses and coat -- and post videos on the internet. denied the diversions of drugs and liquor. sometimes alcohol was found used and abused.

some people huffed -- a risky high. " general bolger: that's what happens when you send people over and over to a war. is that what we want to do to our citizens? we have means of stopping it -- discipline and stop -- suck like that. people are just asking, what am i doing over here? brian lamb: your son is in the military. general bolger: my son is a west point graduate. he was an infantry battalion in afghanistan. he has been in fire fights. he has done his job. i think he is going to get out not because he dislikes because he is proud of his service, but i think he is ready to move on. brian lamb: our guest has been

daniel bolger, his book is called "why we lost: a general's inside account of the iraq and afghanistan wars ." thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> as c-span marks 10 years of compelling conversations on "q &a," here are some other programs viewers may like. rory kennedy on her film "last days in vietnam." you can watch these anytime or

search the entire library at c-span.org. >> monday night, we met up with "wired magazine" reporter. >> what does oled stand for? >> we use led backlights to color liquid crystal displays, and this one is using individual led particles as a source of light. it can be turned on and off independently. with leds, you always see some kind of light. to my eyes, this is pretty amazing. this is 4k